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**Measuring NORTHCOM:  
Performance Measurement in Civil  
Support and Homeland Defense**

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## Table of Contents

Introduction.....	4
NORTHCOM Background .....	5
Development of Measures .....	6
Selection and Types of Measures .....	7
FY13 Defense Budget Performance Improvement.....	8
Joint Training System (JTS) .....	11
Logic Models .....	12
Use of Measures.....	13
Analysis of Performance.....	15
New Tools Needed.....	17
Conclusion .....	18
References.....	20
Appendix A.....	22

## Table of Figures

Figure 1: Sample FY13 DoD Performance Improvement Guidance.....	10
Figure 2: Phase I Requirements .....	12

## Introduction

*“Hurricane Sandy offered us a glimpse of what a complex catastrophe which spans several States and regions could look like. We will continue to mature the successful dual-status command construct ... so that we will be ready to act swiftly and with unity of effort when the unthinkable happens and we are called.”*

~ General Charles Jacoby, Jr., Commander, US Northern Command (NORTHCOM), March 20, 2013

Speaking before the House Armed Services Committee in March 2013, General Jacoby addressed the ongoing challenge faced by the U.S. military during civil support operations in the homeland. His comments elicit some important questions requiring further investigation in order to continue improving military operational capabilities and capacities during civil support missions. For instance, how do we know that the military succeeded in the response to Hurricane Sandy? What are the indicators of a successful military response during a civil support scenario? General Jacoby and others in Department of Defense (DoD) leadership roles declared the Sandy response operation a success; but by what measure? Why was the operation successful, per General Jacoby’s assertion? Why did it work better compared to previous military response efforts such as Hurricane Katrina? These are just some of the many questions with implications for future plans, policies, and procedures that should be addressed as we continue to examine the Hurricane Sandy response and mature military civil support operations under U.S. Northern Command and other applicable command and management architectures.

This case study examines U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and its indirect performance management program. The research specifically addresses the history and development of NORTHCOM and the need to establish a unified military command entity responsible for the protection of the United States following the terrorist attacks of 9/11/2001. In this context, the case study looks at the unique and continually evolving mission NORTHCOM

is responsible for performing and the varying ways in which the Department of Defense measures and assesses this critical requirement. The programs and tools NORTHCOM uses to manage and evaluate performance are presented along with a discussion of the different ways performance measures are applied to operational scenarios. Using the information presented in the performance management case study, the paper concludes with a brief argument advocating for the establishment and implementation of a new performance management tool that has far-reaching applicability to a range of NORTHCOM-specific missions and brings with it a unique opportunity for improving processes and overall performance. In order to fully understand the complexities presented in the remainder of this paper, it is first necessary to address the brief history, mission, goals, and objectives of U.S. Northern Command and its current operational footprint in domestic incident civil support, response, and security.

## **NORTHCOM Background**

NORTHCOM is one of nine Combatant Commands (COCOM) under DoD control and geographically dispersed throughout the globe. The command is situated under the direct authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). Other more well-known COCOM's include US Special Operations Command (SOCOM), US European Command (EURCOM), and US Central Command (CENTCOM). As a subordinate element in the overall structure of the DoD, each of these COCOM's maintains its own unique mission, areas of responsibility, and operational capabilities relative to its mission. As the military combatant command responsible for ensuring domestic security and timely civil support response when requested, NORTHCOM must remain in a constant state of readiness and vigilance. As such, the mission of NORTHCOM is robust:

“Conduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests within the assigned area of

responsibility; and as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, provide defense support of civil authorities including consequence management operations” (US NORTHCOM, 2006, p. 2).

In addition, NORTHCOM’s vision statement is direct and succinct: “United States Northern Command defends America’s homeland – protecting our people, national power, and freedom of action” (NORTHCOM, 2006, p. 3). With the significance of the mission and vision respectively, the command must maintain a heightened state of awareness and be prepared to coordinate and execute homeland defense and civil support missions in response to manmade or natural disasters (NORTHCOM, 2006). In simpler terms, NORTHCOM is the principal agency within the Department of Defense responsible for overseeing domestic military operations in response to a variety of contingency scenarios (disasters, terrorism, national security special events, etc). If the U.S. military is ordered to conduct missions within the United States and/or its territories, NORTHCOM is the lead agency in charge of such operations. While the mission capability and requirements of NORTHCOM are extremely important to the safety and security of the American people, NORTHCOM is a newly established command and lacks a command-specific performance measurement system.

## **Development of Measures**

Since its 2002 creation in response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11/2001, NORTHCOM has been accountable to the American public for ensuring the safety and security of the United States from a variety of threats. However, because of the broad scope of this requirement, specified performance measures are relatively absent in the command’s strategic plan and guidance. Beyond the above mission and vision statements, the most recent strategic plan lists four specific goals relative to NORTHCOM’s mission. Each goal is accompanied by objectives that guide the tasks and activities of the command towards accomplishing its mission

(NORTHCOM, 2006). NORTHCOM's goals (1-4) and objectives (a-e), according to its strategic plan, are listed in Appendix A. While these goals and objectives are relevant to the specific mission of NORTHCOM, they fail to address the required elements of sound strategic plans (Bryson, 2011) and useful performance measures (Poister, 2003). The objectives contained in NORTHCOM's strategic plan are specific, *achievable*, and *relevant* but lack any degree of *measurability* or *time-bound* parameters. This is a notable weakness in the command's measurement process that is explained in subsequent sections. While NORTHCOM lacks command-specific measures, DoD does not.

As the largest federal government agency in terms of personnel and budget (Defense.gov, 2013), DoD maintains a detailed and comprehensive performance measurement system that receives annual updates based on the evolving political, financial, and operational landscape. Since DoD's spending power is derived from taxpayer contributions, ensuring responsible resource allocation (read: spending) is a key area of emphasis within the Department. The performance measurement system in place for the DoD provides one type of oversight vehicle to ensure the aforementioned responsible resource allocation. However, budgetary guidelines and limitations are not the only factor influencing the selection and development of operational performance measures. As mentioned, NORTHCOM is responsible to the people of the United States for providing timely and effective response when needed. In order to assess NORTHCOM's functional capability in this mission area, DoD uses performance measures designed to determine operational "readiness" and the ability to perform required tasks.

## **Selection and Types of Measures**

Since 2002, there has been an ongoing effort to improve the NORTHCOM's approach to accomplishing its many missions. However, unlike other government agencies both in and out of

the military that have had the luxury of time to improve their performance, NORTHCOM is still developing its operational performance measurement and assessment strategies and tools.

Currently there are two distinct publications establishing performance measures for NORTHCOM. The Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 Defense Budget's Performance Improvement guidelines establish the larger DoD-wide performance measures; only one of which applies to NORTHCOM and is strictly tied to budget requirements rather than operational performance. From the operational perspective, NORTHCOM's performance is measured through the Joint Training System (JTS); a DoD publication guiding the training and readiness standards for military units performing a variety of missions. These two guidance documents provide the substance for NORTHCOM's current performance management approach and are discussed in detail in the following sections.

### **FY13 Defense Budget Performance Improvement**

In order to comply with the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 and its amendment in 2010, every four years the DoD publishes an updated Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The QDR satisfies DoD's legislatively mandated GPRA requirement to establish a Strategic Plan. The most recent QDR (2010) establishes five strategic goals and twenty strategic objectives each mapped to one of the five goals. Each year, the DoD updates and releases its fiscal year (FY) budget plan overview which establishes the specific performance measures for each of the strategic goals and objectives contained within the QDR. As a subordinate element of DoD, NORTHCOM-specific performance measures fall under certain strategic goals contained in the QDR and reiterated in the DoD Strategic Management Plan (DoD, 2011).

Within these five strategic goals established by DoD, NORTHCOM is a “contributing component” to only Strategic Goal 3: Prepare to Defeat Adversaries and Succeed in a Wide Range of Contingencies (DoD, 2011; DoD, 2013). Within the scope of responsibility under Strategic Goal 3, NORTHCOM is tasked with meeting, or at contributing to the achievement of, all five Strategic Objectives. Each of the five objectives is mapped to specific and measurable performance measures. These measures, while arguably attainable and relevant, lack a time-bound element to satisfy Poister’s (2003) “SMART” requirements of performance measurements. These measures contribute to the development of the NORTHCOM Strategic Planning Guidance which establishes similar yet more specific goals and objectives within the agency scope of responsibility (NORTHCOM, 2006). Unlike the DoD planning documents referenced above that contain comprehensive and cost-centric examples of performance measures, the strategic goals mapped to NORTHCOM and its partner commands do not reflect budgetary measures. Rather, each goal is tied to a specific capability associated with response times, logistics support capacity, and other such operationally-driven measures.

According to personnel within NORTHCOM, the performance measures contained in the FY13 DoD Budget Performance Improvement guidance do translate to specific budget requirements (i.e. “By 2012, DoD will have and maintain one Defense Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive (CBRNE) Response Force trained, equipped, evaluated, and certified at a response time of 24-48 hours” (DoD, 2013, p. 8-51)). While there is no specific budget measure associated with this strategic goal, there is a financial requirement to be able to meet this goal (military personnel pay, equipment cost, training cost, facilities, etc). These requirements can be aggregated to define a budgetary performance measure specifically mapped to this strategic goal (i.e. In order to ensure this goal is met, NORTHCOM must maintain \$X to

pay Y personnel, equipment costs, etc). So while these measures can be used to define some aspect of performance, there are notable issues with validity and reliability.

Reliability, according to Poister (2003) is “a matter of objectivity and precision” (p. 88). With this in mind, DoD’s performance measures for Strategic Goal 3 (Figure 1) are just that: objectively defined and precise. However, their validity, or “the extent to which an indicator is directly related to and representative of the performance dimension of interest” (Poister, 2003, p. 88), is more questionable. For example, Strategic Objective 3.1.1 -F2B (Figure 1) is of questionable validity to the overall command performance. While training and equipping Homeland Response Forces (HRF’s) to respond to an incident within a specified timeframe is valuable and improves their responsiveness, this measure alone does not necessarily ensure their flexibility in conducting such operations. Simply maintaining the ability to deploy forces within a certain time limit does not result in the flexible conduct of operations. There are numerous complexities associated with domestic response operations that contribute to the complex management challenge associated with executing these operations. No two operations are the same. Therefore, establishing strict time requirements for executing operations is not a valid measure of effective performance in all cases.

<b>DoD STRATEGIC GOAL# 3: PREPARE TO DEFEAT ADVERSARIES AND SUCCEED IN A WIDE RANGE OF CONTINGENCIES.</b>		
<b>DoD Forces and Infrastructure Category 1F2: Homeland Defense</b>		
<b>DoD Strategic Objective 3.1.1F2B</b> <i>Improve the responsiveness and flexibility of consequence management response forces.</i>		
<b>Performance Measures</b>	<b>Long-term Performance Goals</b>	<b>Annual Performance Goals</b>
3.1.1-1F2B: Cumulative number of Homeland Response Forces (HRFs) trained, equipped, evaluated, and validated at a reduced response time of 6-12 hours (USD(P))	3.1.1-1F2B: By FY 2012, the DoD will have ten National Guard HRFs trained, equipped, evaluated, and validated at a reduced response time of 6-12 hours to a very significant or catastrophic event.	FY07 – 10 Actual: Non-applicable FY11: 2 <b>FY11 Actual: 2</b>
<b>Contributing DoD Components:</b> USPACOM, USNORTHCOM, Army, Air Force, and National Guard Bureau		
3.1.2-1F2B: Cumulative number of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosives Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFPs) trained, equipped, evaluated, and validated at a response time of 6-12 hours (USD(P))	3.1.2-1F2B: By FY 2012, the DoD will have nine new National Guard CERFPs trained, equipped, evaluated, and validated at a response time of 6-12 hours in order to backfill existing CERFPs that will convert to HRFs.	FY07 – 10 Actual: Non-applicable FY11: 2 <b>FY11 Actual: 17</b>
<b>Contributing DoD Components:</b> USPACOM, USNORTHCOM, Army, Air Force, and National Guard Bureau		

**Figure 1: Sample FY13 DoD Performance Improvement Guidance**  
(DoD, 2013, p. 7-47)

While the measures themselves lack numerical specificity in some cases, they can and do provide a basis for establishing budgetary requirements in order to comply with the listed performance measure. Compliance with this and other similar budget requirements is only the first step to meeting other more operationally-specific performance measures contained in the Joint Training System (JTS).


### **Joint Training System (JTS)**

The operationally-specific performance measures used by NORTHCOM have undergone a series of changes as homeland defense and national security missions have evolved over the last ten years. With the development of tools such as the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP, 2007), NORTHCOM's measurement process has adapted to fit the evolving trends and requirements. Building on this, NORTHCOM's performance requirements are directly measured based on unit performance during training and simulations designed to replicate real-world scenarios the military may face in the future. The government document for this training, and NORTHCOM's default performance measurement rubric is the Joint Training System (JTS). The JTS is a guidance document that establishes a list of performance measures used to assess military unit readiness compared to listed standards and requirements. The JTS:

“assists commanders at all echelons in defining the required level of individual, staff, and collective performance; determining the current level(s) of performance; executing training programs to improve performance; and, finally, assessing those levels of performance relative to mission capability requirements” (CJCSG 3501, 2012, p. A-2).

By aligning missions to strategies, the JTS defines process requirements for ensuring the training and readiness of military units. Military units use the performance measures set forth in the JTS and other such publications to assess their overall readiness to complete a given mission. A unit that has achieved a specified capability level according to the parameters set forth in the

JTS is expected to be able to perform on a level commensurate with this rating during an actual operation. Through a series of logic-model-based designs, the JTS and its corresponding publication, the Joint Training Manual (JTM) (CJCSM 3500.03C, 2011), present a comprehensive list of operational requirements by phase. Each phase of a military operation is separated into a process flow chart (Figure 2) that defines the needed inputs, processes, and outputs of the phase of the operation. The desired outcome of JTS and JTM guidance is a to establish a list of baseline performance measures used to provide the president with a trained and capable military force ready to execute a wide range of missions in support of U.S. interests (CJCSM 3500.03C, 2011; CJCSG 3501, 2012).



**Figure 2: Phase I Requirements**  
(CJCSM 3500.03C, 2011, p. C-3)

## Logic Models

Much of the military planning process, from both a macro and micro perspective, uses the basic “if-then” approach inherent in the logic model concept. Many DoD plans, including the Strategic Goals, Objectives, and Performance Measures discussed here contain core logic model

elements including inputs, activities/processes, and even some examples of outputs (17 trained National Guard HRF units by FY 2012; DoD, 2013, p. 7-62; Figure 2 above). Many government approaches to performance management are heavily focused on achieving quantifiable outputs in support of their missions/goals. In DoD, outputs are widely used to assess the efficiency, effectiveness, and overall worthiness of a program or contract (mostly during peacetime operations in consonance with Wilson's (1989) typology of organizations in Van Dooren, Bouckaert, and Halligan, 2010, p. 29)). Most performance measures reviewed for this case study fail to include outcomes, however. This is where the military's operational achievements are difficult to label. In the case of domestic response and NORTHCOM, the possible outcomes associated with a theoretical logic model would relate to the safety and security of the American public. However, this is a difficult outcome to measure. NORTHCOM instead relies on the use of the aforementioned performance measures to assess its readiness and ability to perform its required missions during training scenarios rather than during real-world operations. The theory is that readiness equals capability (CJCSM 3500.03C, 2011).

## **Use of Measures**

The primary purpose for measuring performance is to ensure mission readiness and compliance with expected standards. According to a senior NORTHCOM Plans Officer, NORTHCOM is accountable to "the people of the United States. The public is our assessor. They determine every day whether we have met our performance goals. If the country is safe and no one is complaining, then we have done our job" (Subject A, personal communication, 2013). However, as will be demonstrated in the next section, other NORTHCOM personnel maintain a different perspective regarding performance measurement and accountability.

Subject B, a Medical Plans Officer with NORTHCOM notes that there is a more complex relationship involved in the overall use of performance measures than Subject A suggests. As noted, there are numerous standards which NORTHCOM must comply with on a regular basis. Reporting these readiness requirements is a “time consuming and labor-intensive process that often gets in the way of us doing our jobs; our main jobs and tasks that we are responsible for” (Subject B, personal communication, 2013). Beyond this, there is a significant degree of variability in the service demands and requirements. NORTHCOM’s mission is to protect the homeland and coordinate military response efforts to both man-made and natural disasters. The scope of this mission and the responsibilities, goals, objectives, and tasks associated are beyond the scope of most major corporations. From logistics to engineering to security to search and rescue, the list of mission requirements is extensive.

As such, ensuring readiness and compliance with the seemingly endless list of Mission Essential Tasks (MET’s) for which NORTHCOM is responsible is daunting. This process accountability as described by Subject B is reflected in a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report assessing NORTHCOM’s exercise program and the applicability of its performance evaluation approaches:

“We found that NORTHCOM has developed a comprehensive exercise program consistent with DOD’s Joint Training System. For example, NORTHCOM uses the Joint Training Information Management System to link training objectives with its Joint Mission Essential Task List. NORTHCOM officials enter information on task performance of exercise participants into the Joint Training Information Management System to evaluate the extent to which the command is trained based on performance requirements in the Joint Mission Essential Task List” (GAO, 2009, p. 26).

Due to the variability of missions and the specific subject matter expertise required to ensure efficient and effective training, readiness, and execution, there is extensive talent representation in NORTHCOM. The “one-size fits all” approach to civil support and homeland

defense is an inappropriate way to measure unit readiness. With this, the variation in capacity to conduct performance measurement is significant. Additionally, due to the hierarchical structuring of the command, some measurement requirements are different among the support cells represented within. Much of this variance in reporting; format, content, etc, is a reflection of the different leadership styles (both military and civilian).

Beyond the variation in reporting performance measures, there are several things that affect the usefulness and applicability of these measures. According to NORTHCOM personnel, NORTHCOM's mission is unique in that no two homeland defense or civil support scenario are the same. Therefore, a performance measure that can be applied to one scenario may not be well-suited to another. In addition, NORTHCOM is a joint military command and is not in direct competition with any particular government agency. The joint mission of NORTHCOM is unique because it brings together the capabilities of all four branches of the U.S. military as well as the resources of large federal agencies including the Department of Homeland Security and its several subordinate agencies (U.S. Coast Guard, Customs and Border Patrol, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency). The collaborative approach that NORTHCOM takes toward achieving their mission facilitates a "non-competitive environment where we are all working towards the same goals and objectives" (Subject A, personal communication, 2013).

## **Analysis of Performance**

Actual civil support or domestic defense operations are not suitable environments for conducting performance assessments. Therefore, the training scenarios used to prepare military units and support staffs for executing actual operations serve as the only assessment environments available for analyzing NORTHCOM's performance against the established measures. While the assessment opportunities are limited to a series of pre-planned annual

training events, there are numerous ways that managers and senior military commanders at NORTHCOM can be reprimanded for demonstrating poor performance against the required standards of readiness.

NORTHCOM and its supporting agencies can receive insufficient readiness ratings following a comprehensive assessment of exercise performance. Generally speaking, the main form of punishment used for poor performance in these scenarios is to address observed gaps through official reports recommending remedial action for improving future performance. For the larger support structure, it is difficult to conceive a scenario where formal punishment (firing, demotion, leave of absence, etc) would result. However, for senior military commanders, the threat of punishment is significant. Military commanders can be relieved of their command for poor performance in a variety of capacities. In the case of NORTHCOM, there are several senior military officers that operate under the constant threat of losing their command authority for poorly managed exercises, or worse, poorly managed civil support operations in real-world contexts. In most cases, this threat serves as enough motivation for commanders to ensure unit readiness and compliance with the established performance measures (Subject B, personal communication, 2013). As is the case across most military organizations, there are incentives for good performance as well.

Whereas commanders and other senior leaders in NORTHCOM face constant pressure to perform against clearly established measures or risk disciplinary action, exceeding expectations through outstanding performance often results in formal award recognition for both individuals and units alike. Like many other civil service occupations (fire, police, etc), military personnel receive both individual and unit participation awards for a variety of meritorious service actions. In the case of NORTHCOM, awards are sometimes presented to the unit as a whole for

meritorious performance exceeding normal expectations. NORTHCOM has received numerous unit awards since its 2002 inauguration for a variety of service actions. For example, NORTHCOM was awarded the Joint Meritorious Unit Award in 2009 for outstanding performance in support of California wildfires as well as efforts in support of flooding and hurricane response during the previous year (northcom.mil, 2009). In the case of most unit awards, personnel serving in the command who meet established award criteria and who supported or participated in the award period of service receive the award. Beyond unit awards, individuals receive recognition for outstanding performance through a variety of command-sponsored annual award programs as well as through individual recommendations from superior officers. The types of awards offered and criteria for each are extensive and require discussion beyond the scope of this paper.

The purpose of this particular discussion is to emphasize that there are both incentives to avoid poor performance as well as motivations for outstanding performance. Due to the culture of the military and the physical display of awards on one's uniform, the motivations for outstanding performance in many cases outweigh the threats of poor performance. Military personnel literally wear their resumes on their chests (awards displayed on the uniform). For many, this is a significant incentive to perform above expectations on a regular basis. While the award system is robust and serves as a motivation for some to perform well, the larger performance management and assessment process at NORTHCOM is far from perfect.

### **New Tools Needed**

Current military civil support operations lack an appropriate method to measure performance. Many of the performance measures presented are not specific to NORTHCOM or civil support scenarios. Rather, they are generalized concepts designed to provide a baseline

assessment of military readiness against a series of often arbitrary requirements. There is a need for an improved tool to measure military civil support operations; a tool that excludes specific numerical requirements that are in many cases not applicable and instead emphasizes the institutionalization of core processes to ensure improved operational performance.

According to Dr. Elaine Kamarck, Brookings Fellow and Professor of Policy at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, federal agencies typically assess performance in relation to adherence to rules and procedures. Dr. Kamarck contends based on her ongoing research that governments are trending towards implementing performance metrics to measure and evaluate organizational processes. According to Dr. Kamarck, "In the near future, government performance will revolve around metrics and a performance-based accountability system" beyond the current required GPRA standards (Kamarck, personal communication, 2013). Given this, DoD and NORTHCOM should seek to establish a relevant tool for assessing, measuring, and improving their civil support functions and performance. Focusing this tool on the relevant processes inherent in every mission will help DoD and NORTHCOM toward improving the understanding and execution of these complex management challenges.

## **Conclusion**

Performance management in the military is a seldom-studied field. In terms of performance assessment and U.S. Northern Command specifically, there is an open opportunity for research to address the noted challenges in this area. This case study only begins to address the issues and serves as a starting point for additional research in the field. After reviewing the history and development of NORTHCOM as a combatant command, the case study presented the current methods NORTHCOM uses to assess and measure its performance during civil support training scenarios. The development and selection of performance measures was addressed. As

well, the type, use and analysis of performance measures for NORTHCOM's military operations were presented. Lastly, a brief argument was made addressing the perceived need to create new measurement tools and processes in order to further improve the critical missions NORTHCOM is responsible for performing. NORTHCOM continues to play a key role in providing military civil support during national security events and disasters. We must continue to strive for improvements in the way we conduct these critical operations in order to satisfy the over-arching goal of all defense support of civil authorities missions; that is to "save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate great property damage within the United States (DoD 3025.18, 2012, p. 4).

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## Appendix A

### U.S. NORTHCOM Strategic Goals and Objectives

1. Detect, deter, prevent, and defeat external threats and aggression
  - a. Improve situational awareness of potential threats in all domains
  - b. Maintain operational readiness with correlated intelligence, access to ready operational forces, and regular interaction with mission partners
  - c. Maintain flexible, executable, rapidly adaptable, and regularly-exercised plans
  - d. Advocate for capabilities to detect, deter, prevent, and defeat current and emerging threats
2. Provide timely and effective defense support to civil authorities
  - a. Anticipate requests for civil support
  - b. Provide military capabilities at the right place and right time
  - c. Maintain flexible, executable, rapidly adaptable, and regularly exercised plans
  - d. Support efforts to improve capabilities of mission partners
  - e. Enhance interoperability and information sharing with mission partners
3. Improve unity of effort with our interagency and international partners
  - a. Advocate the development of a National Homeland Security Plan
  - b. Develop better mechanisms for coordinating and integrating efforts with our interagency partners
  - c. Maintain an active theater security cooperation program
  - d. Develop a close working relationship with Canada Command and continue to collaborate closely with NORAD
  - e. Execute a synchronized strategic communication plan
4. Create a more agile organization that takes care of its people and meets the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century
  - a. Analyze organizational structures and internal processes to yield greater efficiencies and improve mission effectiveness
  - b. Develop and empower our people and enable them to succeed
  - c. Recognize and reward excellence and innovation
  - d. Foster an environment of mutual respect and integrity